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ABSTRACT
A key way in which banks mitigate the eects of phishing is to
removefraudulentwebsitesorsuspendabusivedomainnames.
This ‘take-down’ is often subcontracted to specialist compa-
nies. Prior work has shown that these take-down companies
refuse to share their ‘feeds’ of phishing website URLs with
each other, and consequently, many phishing websites are not
removed because the company with the take-down contract re-
mains unaware of their existence. The take-down companies
are reticent to exchange their feeds with each other, fearing
that competitors with less comprehensive feeds might ‘free-
ride’ o their eorts and stop investing resources to ﬁnd new
websites, as well as use the feeds to poach clients. To help
solve this problem, we propose the Phish Market protocol,
which enables companies with less comprehensive feeds to
learn about websites impersonating their own clients that are
held by other ﬁrms. The protocol is designed so that the con-
tributing ﬁrm is compensated only for those websites aect-
ing its competitor’s clients and only those previously unknown
to the receiving ﬁrm. Crucially, the protocol does not reveal
to the contributing source which URLs are needed by the re-
ceiver, as this is viewed as sensitive information by take-down
ﬁrms. Using the complete lists of phishing URLs obtained
from two large take-down companies, our elliptic-curve-based
implementation added a negligible average 5 second delay to
securely share URLs.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.4.4 [Computing Milieux]: Computers and Society—Elec-
tronicCommerce, Security; C.2.4[Computer-Communication
Networks]: Distributed Systems—Distribut ed Applications
Keywords
phishing, electroniccrime, cryptography, securemultipartycom-
putation
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1. INTRODUCTION
Phishing is the criminal activity of enticing people into vis-
iting websites that impersonate genuine bank1 websites, and
to dupe them into revealing passwords and other credentials
to carry out fraudulent activities. One of the key countermea-
sures to phishing is the prompt removal of the imitation bank
websites. Removal may be achieved by erasing the web pages
from the hosting machine, or by contacting a registrar to sus-
pend a domain name from the DNS so the fraudulent host can
no longer be resolved.
Although some banks deal with phishing website removal
exclusively ‘in-house’, most hire specialist ‘take-down com-
panies’ to carry out the task. Take-down companies – typi-
cally divisions of brand-protection companies or information
security service providers – perform two key services for the
banks. First, they are good at getting phishing websites re-
moved quickly, having developed relationships with ISPs and
registrars across the globe and deployed multi-lingual teams
at 24x7 operations centers. Second, they collect a more timely
and comprehensive listing of phishing URLs than the banks
are often capable of gathering.
Thetake-downcompaniesnegotiatefeedsofrawURLsfrom
several sources: clearinghouses such as CastleCops2 and the
Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG)3, individual ISPs, and
banks. Additionally, they process their own incoming email
spam traps and what turns up at dormant domains that they
own. Reported URLs from all sources are examined for ac-
curacy. The companies thereby create their own feed with
validated URLs and most false positives removed. The feed
is used internally for their own take-down activities, but also
occasionally supplied to client banks who perform their own
take-downs and to ISPs or domain name registrars who pay to
proactively police their own corner of the Internet.
Most take-down companies view their URL feeds as a key
competitive advantage over banks and other take-down provi-
ders. However, recent work has shown that the feeds compiled
by take-down companies suer from large gaps in coverage
that signiﬁcantly prolong the time taken to remove phishing
websites. Moore and Clayton examined six months of ag-
gregated URL feeds from many sources, including two ma-
1Although a wide range of companies have been subject to
phishing attacks, the vast majority are ﬁnancial institutions;
hence for simplicity, we use the term ‘banks’ for the ﬁrms be-
ing attacked.
2http://www.castlecops.com/pirt
3http://www.antiphishing.org/jor take-down companies [2]. They found that up to 40% of
thephishingwebsitesimpersonatingbankshiredbytake-down
companies were known to others but not by the company with
thetake-downcontract. Another29%ofwebsiteswerediscov-
ered by the responsible take-down company only after others
had identiﬁed the sites. By measuring the substantially longer
lifetimes of these missed websites, Moore and Clayton esti-
mated that at least $330 million per year is being put at risk by
the failure to share proprietary feeds of URLs for just the two
companies they studied.
But is sharing the answer? If so, then how should an eec-
tive sharing mechanism be designed?
Moore and Clayton appealed to the security industry’s sense
of responsibility and argued that URL feeds should be shared
freely between take-down companies and the banks. They
point to the precedent of sharing in the anti-virus industry.
Anti-virus companies started sharing raw virus deﬁnitions in
the early 1990’s once it became clear that no single company
could detect all viruses. Moore and Clayton also claim that
most take-down companies (and all banks) stand to gain from
increased sharing. Knowing about more websites could of-
fer increased revenue for take-down companies if they charge
per site removed. In any case, it would lead to increased cus-
tomer satisfaction for the banks since websites could be re-
moved more quickly.
However, there are some reasonable objections to a sharing
free-for-all. First, it can be argued that competition between
take-down companies has driven investment towards devel-
oping better techniques for identifying new phishing websites
faster. Mandated sharing might undermine the incentive to de-
velop new techniques. Unsurprisingly, most take-down com-
panies would rather see banks purchase the services of several
take-down providers to overcome gaps in coverage.
Our proposed solution is Phish Market, a protocol that ad-
dresses the competitive concerns of take-down companies so
that widespread sharing can take place. To bolster the incen-
tive to share, our protocol enables sharing of URLs where the
net contributors are compensated without revealing the sensi-
tive details of what is shared to competitors. At a high level,
the Phish Market protocol does the following:
1. shares only those URLs that the receiving party wants
(i.e., the banks the receiving party works for);
2. does not reveal to the providing party which URLs are
given to the receiving party;
3. securely tallies the number of URLs given to the receiv-
ing party;
4. does not count URLs the receiving party already has.
Timing is critical when it comes to distributing URL feeds
— the longer a phishing website remains online, the more cus-
tomer credentials may be at risk. Although, in theory, generic
multiparty computation protocols can be used to implement
this mechanism, they are very inecient and would introduce
signiﬁcant delays in processing the many thousands of phish-
ing websites. In contrast, our custom protocol is extremely
ecient (and still provably secure).
To demonstrate the feasibility of our mechanism, we have
implemented an elliptic-curve-based version of the protocol in
Java. Using the feeds from two take-down companies during
the ﬁrst two weeks of April 2009, we tested protocol perfor-
mance in a real-world scenario. We found that our sharing
protocol introduces an average delay of 5 seconds to the pro-
cessing and transmission per phishing URL. In exchange for
this very short delay, information on new phishing websites is
exchanged between take-down companies so that the overall
lifetime of phishing websites may be halved [2] while credit-
ing the contributing ﬁrm.
2. THE PHISH MARKET PROTOCOL
An Optimal Ideal-World Protocol.
We describe the task our protocol performs by ﬁrst explain-
ing how it could be done if we used a trusted third party (TTP)
— someone who was entirely trusted by both the contributor
(or Seller) and the receiver (or Buyer). To share data in this
ideal scenario, both the Buyer and the Seller would send the
data to the TTP; the Buyer’s data consists of the URLs she
already knows and her list of client banks, while the Seller’s
data consists of the URLs he is attempting to sell and their
classiﬁcation (i.e., which bank each URL is attempting to im-
personate). The TTP could then send the Buyer only those
URLs that both impersonate her clients and that she did not
already know. The TTP would send the Seller the number of
URLs sent to the Buyer. This number would then be used to
compute the compensation owed to the Seller. Since the TTP
only sends the new “interesting” URLs to the Buyer, she will
not learn anything about URLs she was not interested in (and
would not have to pay for them). On the other hand, the TTP
sends the Seller only the number of URLs sold, not the URLs
themselves. Consequently, the Seller will not gain additional
information about the Buyer’s client list.
Our protocol is intended to provide this functionality, main-
taining its privacy properties, but without requiring a third
party. Using powerful results from theoretical cryptography,
it is known how to convert any task that can be performed
with the aid of a TTP to one that does not require third parties.
However, these techniques are usually inecient. In our case,
even the most ecient implementations of general techniques
(suchastheFairplaysystem[1])wouldbeordersofmagnitude
too slow for practical use.
We give an ecient protocol for executing a single ‘trans-
action’ of the following form: the Seller ﬁrst sends a ‘tag’
to the Buyer. The tag can be, for example, the name of the
bank associated with the URL to be sold. The Buyer uses
the tag to decide whether or not she is interested in learning
the corresponding URL. She also commits in advance to the
set of URLs she already knows. If the Buyer was interested
in the tag and did not already know the corresponding URL,
the Seller receives a ‘payment’. Otherwise, the Seller receives
a ‘counterfeit payment’ (the Seller should not be able to tell
whether or not a payment is counterfeit — this would indicate
whether or not the Buyer was interested in the URL, and thus
give information about the Buyer’s client list).
At the end of some previously agreed period (or number of
transactions), the Buyer reveals to the Seller how many ‘real’
payments were sent, and proves that this is indeed the case
(without revealing which of the payments were real).
In practice, we envision each pair of take-down companies
executing the basic protocol in both directions: when one of
the companies acquires a new URL, it would execute the pro-tocol as the Seller, with the other company playing the Buyer.
When the second company acquires a new URL, it would exe-
cute an instance of the protocol in the other direction, with the
ﬁrst party as Buyer and the second as Seller.
2.1 Phish Market Protocol Overview
Payment Commitments.
Before we describe the protocol itself, we must clarify what
we mean by ‘real’ and ‘counterfeit’ payments. Our protocol
uses cryptographic commitments as payment tokens. Loosely
speaking, a commitment to a value x can be thought of as a
public-key encryption of the number 1, for which only the
Buyer knows the secret key; the Seller can’t tell what x is from
the commitment, but the Buyer can ‘open’ a commitment and
prove to the Seller that the commitment is to a speciﬁc value.
In our protocol, A ‘real’ payment is a cryptographic commit-
ment to the number 1, while a ‘counterfeit’ payment is a com-
mitment to the number 0.
The payment commitments used by the protocol have a spe-
cial property that allows them to be eciently aggregated,
even in encrypted form (they are homomorphic). Thus, the
Seller can take the ‘payments’ from multiple executions of the
basicprotocolandcomputeacommitmenttothetotalpayment
(the number of URLs actually ‘sold’).
TheBuyerwilleventuallyopentheaggregatedcommitment.
At this point, the Seller will learn only the total number num-
ber of ‘real’ payments received (and not which individual pay-
ments were real). This value can be used as the basis for a
monetary transaction between the two parties.
Protocol Construction.
One of the more dicult challenges to solve eciently is
that the Buyer should not have to pay for URLs she already
knew, whilesimultaneouslyprotectingtheprivacyoftheBuyer’s
client list. The known techniques for general secure computa-
tion of a function require an expensive public-key operation
for each input (or even each bit of the input). In our case, the
inputwouldhavetoincludethesetofpreviouslyknownURLs,
which may be very large: A typical take-down company could
learn an excess of 10000 URLs per month, making existing
systems impractical.
Tosolvethisproblem, welettheBuyerperformthedatabase
search locally, after learning the URL. If she discovers the
URL in the database, she must then prove to the Seller that
the URL existed in the database before the start of the trans-
action. However, this proof cannot use the URL itself, since
that would reveal to the Seller that the Buyer was interested in
it (thus exposing one of the Buyer’s clients). The main idea
behind the protocol is to split the proof into two:
1. The ﬁrst proof is a ‘proof of payment’. The payment
in this case is a commitment to the value 1; the proof
of payment proves that the Buyer can open the commit-
ment she sent to the value 1.
2. The second proof is a ‘proof of previous knowledge’.
This proof convinces the Seller that the Buyer knew the
URL before the start of the protocol.
The essence of the protocol is that we allow the Buyer to ‘fake’
a proof if she knows a corresponding secret key. The protocol
is set up so that the Buyer initially knows a single secret key:
Figure 2.1: Simpliﬁed Phish Market protocol overview.
she can fake the ﬁrst proof or the second proof, but not both.
Once the Buyer learns the tag, she must make a choice: she
can either learn the corresponding URL, or learn the second
secret key (but not both). Thus, if she chooses not to learn the
URL, the Buyer can send a counterfeit payment (a commit-
ment to 0), and fake both proofs. If she chooses to learn the
URL and did not already know it, she is forced to fake the sec-
ond proof, and therefore cannot fake the ﬁrst (so she must send
a real payment). This choice is enforced by using oblivious
transfer (OT), a basic primitive in many cryptographic proto-
cols. The proofs we use are Zero-Knowledge (ZK) proofs: the
Seller learns nothing from the proof except the validity of its
statement. This protects the security of the Buyer (the Seller
cannot tell whether or not the Buyer was interested in the URL
or whether she previously knew it).
Fig. 2.1 shows a graphical overview of the protocol. We
split the second proof into the boxes labeled ZK Proof #2 and
Proof #3 in the ﬁgure. Before the protocol begins, the Buyer
sends the Seller a commitment to her set of previously known
URLs. ZK Proof #2 proves the Buyer holds a commitment for
the URL (this part can be faked using a secret key). Proof #3
proves the Buyer knew the commitment before the protocol
began (this part cannot be faked; however, if the Buyer faked
ZK Proof #2 she just needs to prove she previously knew some
other commitment (of her choice). The reason for the split is
that Proof #3 can be performed very eciently, while Proof #2
requires public-key type operations.
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